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STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
NRC Could Better Manage the Size and Composition 
of Its Workforce by Further Incorporating Leading 
Practices 
What GAO Found 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has made efforts to enhance its 
strategic human capital management to ensure the agency has the right number 
and composition of staff; however, these efforts do not incorporate some leading 
practices. Leading practices—identified by GAO and others—indicate that using 
forward-looking strategies, setting goals, using data-driven planning and 
accountability systems, and ensuring that employees have relevant knowledge to 
carry out their responsibilities are essential for strategic human capital 
management. NRC has taken steps through Project Aim—an effort to help the 
agency respond more strategically to changes in the nuclear industry—and other 
efforts to manage its human capital, such as developing a strategic workforce 
plan, conducting workload forecasting, and cross-training employees.  
However, GAO identified three areas where NRC’s efforts do not fully 
incorporate leading practices. First, NRC has not established agencywide goals 
for its workforce size or composition—that is, goals for the number of people with 
specific skillsets and levels of expertise—beyond a 2-year budget cycle. Second, 
NRC does not have comprehensive employee skills information because it 
currently does not have a systematic approach or system to track this 
information. Third, in some cases, NRC has not consistently trained managers or 
supervisors on strategic human capital management or assessing employees’ 
skillsets. Without incorporating these practices, NRC cannot determine the most 
appropriate size and composition of the agency’s workforce, and it risks being 
unable to respond to changes in the nuclear industry. NRC has reduced its staff 
by 587 FTEs since its peak in 2011 (see figure), but if not carefully managed, 
imprecise reductions could lead NRC to miss efficiencies in matching its 
workforce with expected demand for services. 
Total Allocated Nuclear Regulatory Commission Full-Time Equivalent Employees, Fiscal 
Years 2005 through 2017
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Why GAO Did This Study 
After the passage of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, which included tax 
incentives for nuclear energy, NRC 
significantly expanded its workforce to 
meet the demands of an anticipated 
increase in workload that ultimately did 
not occur. More recently, a forecast for 
reduced growth in the nuclear industry 
prompted NRC to develop plans for 
changing its structure and workforce to 
better respond to changes in the 
nuclear industry. Strategic human 
capital planning is one of several 
actions the agency is taking. 
The explanatory statement 
accompanying the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2016 
included a provision for GAO to report 
on NRC’s workforce management. 
GAO examined NRC’s strategic human 
capital management efforts and the 
extent to which these efforts 
incorporate leading practices. 
GAO reviewed NRC’s strategic 
workforce plan and other related 
documents and interviewed 
knowledgeable NRC officials. 
What GAO Recommends 
GAO recommends that NRC (1) set 
agencywide goals for workforce size 
and skills composition to meet 
workload demands that extend beyond 
the 2-year budget cycle, (2) establish a 
systematic approach for tracking 
employee skills, and (3) consistently 
train managers and supervisors in 
strategic human capital management 
and assessing employee skillsets. 
NRC generally agreed with these 
recommendations. 
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441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548 
April 27, 2017 
The Honorable Lamar Alexander 
Chairman 
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 
Ranking Member 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 
Committee on Appropriations 
United States Senate 
The Honorable Mike Simpson 
Chairman 
The Honorable Marcy Kaptur 
Ranking Member 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 
Committee on Appropriations 
House of Representatives 
From fiscal years 2005 to 2011, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)—an independent agency established to regulate civilian uses of 
nuclear materials for commercial, industrial, medical, and academic 
purposes in the United States—increased its budget and workforce by 
about 57 percent and about 28 percent, respectively. This increase 
occurred largely in response to the anticipated growth of the commercial 
nuclear industry, referred to as the “nuclear renaissance,” and was aided 
by the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that included tax 
incentives that would favor additional nuclear energy development. As the 
agency responsible for regulating the commercial nuclear industry—
including nuclear power plants and other civilian uses of radioactive 
material, through licensing, inspection, and enforcement of its 
regulations—NRC expected a substantial increase in workload due to a 
projected large number of applications for new nuclear power plants and 
interest in new reactor designs, among other things. In preparation for the 
anticipated workload, NRC’s budget authority grew from $669 million in 
fiscal year 2005 to over $1 billion in fiscal year 2011. Similarly, NRC’s 
workforce grew from about 3,100 full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees to 
Letter 
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about 4,000 FTEs over the same period.1 By 2011, however, it became 
clear that the nuclear renaissance had not materialized for a variety of 
reasons, including low prices of natural gas and concerns about the 
safety of nuclear power plants. Additionally, concerns have been raised 
about the storage of nuclear waste generated by nuclear power plants. 
The forecast of reduced growth in the nuclear industry prompted NRC to 
establish Project Aim in June 2014. Through Project Aim, NRC sought to 
develop plans to establish clearer agencywide priorities, align the 
agency’s budget and workforce with its workload, streamline agency 
processes, and better position the agency to respond to changes in 
external conditions in an agile and flexible manner. NRC’s January 2015 
report on Project Aim estimated that NRC could meet projected industry 
demand in 2020 with its workforce and budget reduced by 10 percent and 
with a workforce composition similar to the agency’s composition in 
2005.2 The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2016 stated that the appropriations 
committees were not satisfied with NRC’s explanation of the basis on 
which it developed workload projections, nor with its plans for the 
execution of Project Aim.3 The explanatory statement also highlighted 
that NRC must be able to effectively and efficiently forecast its future 
workforce and resource needs and adapt its workforce and resource 
allocations accordingly so that the agency has the right number of staff 
with the right skills at the right time. The explanatory statement also 
included a provision that GAO report on NRC’s workload forecasting, 
workforce management, and Project Aim. This report examines NRC’s 
strategic human capital management efforts and the extent to which 
these efforts incorporate leading practices. 
                                                                                                                    
1FTEs reflect the total number of regular straight-time hours (i.e., not including overtime or 
holiday hours) worked by employees divided by the number of compensable hours 
applicable to each fiscal year. For a glossary of federal budgeting terms and definitions, 
see GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2005).  
2Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Achieving Exemplary Nuclear Regulation in the 21st 
Century, Report on Project Aim 2020 (Rockville, MD: January 2015).  
3Section 4 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015), 
provides that the explanatory statement accompanying the act and printed in the 
Congressional Record shall have the same effect as if it were a joint explanatory 
statement of a committee of conference. 
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We have found that addressing complex challenges, such as national 
security and rapidly evolving technologies, requires a high-quality federal 
workforce achieved by following leading practices for strategic human 
capital management.4 In 2001, GAO designated strategic human capital 
management as a government-wide high-risk area, and it remains a high-
risk area because agencies need to address current and emerging critical 
skills gaps that could undermine their ability to meet vital missions.5 
Strategic human capital management involves undertaking workforce 
planning activities to develop long-term strategies and can include, for 
example, selecting, developing, training, and managing staff to create a 
high-quality productive workforce. 
To determine the key efforts NRC has taken as part of its strategic human 
capital management efforts and the extent to which these efforts 
incorporate leading practices, we reviewed agency documents, including 
the agency’s strategic workforce plan, management directives, and 
documentation of recommendations to the Commission and Commission 
decisions. We also analyzed agency-level budget information for staffing 
and appropriations levels. We combined and analyzed FTE requested 
and allocated data from NRC’s budget justifications from fiscal years 
2010 through 2017, as well as actual FTE data that NRC provided us 
from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the last completed fiscal year at the 
time of our data request. Due to the limited scope of the available actual 
FTE data, we supplemented it with allocated FTE data from fiscal years 
2005 through 2009. Where possible, we discuss actual FTE levels but 
made comparisons outside of fiscal years 2010 through 2015 using 
allocated FTE levels. To assess the reliability of the data systems and the 
calculations used to develop actual obligations and FTE levels, we 
reviewed documentation about the systems used to develop the 
information in the budget justification, interviewed NRC staff with 
knowledge of the systems, and reviewed NRC staff responses to written 
questions about the systems and calculations.6 Based on this 
                                                                                                                    
4GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).  
5GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2001), and 
High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed 
on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington D.C., Feb.15, 2017). 
6These systems include NRC’s Budget Formulation System, which NRC uses to manage 
budget formulation data; the Financial Accounting and Integrated Management 
Information System, which NRC uses to manage its budget execution data, among other 
things; and the Human Resources Management System, which NRC uses to manage its 
time and attendance data. 
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assessment, we determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of determining trends in NRC’s FTE and budget levels. 
We also analyzed forecasting data from three of NRC’s five major 
offices—the Office of New Reactors, the Office of Nuclear Material Safety 
and Safeguards, and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.7 We 
selected these three offices because, combined, they lead the business 
lines that house a majority of NRC staff, are allocated the majority of 
NRC’s budget, and perform core programmatic functions of the agency. 
We also reviewed the Project Aim report and related materials, such as 
monthly progress updates. In addition, we interviewed officials 
knowledgeable about Project Aim and NRC’s strategic human capital 
management efforts—including officials from NRC’s Office of the 
Executive Director for Operations, Office of the Chief Human Capital 
Officer, and Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and a representative 
from NRC’s union—about topics such as Project Aim’s implementation, 
goals, recommendations, and outcomes. We also interviewed these 
officials about the agency’s strategic workforce plan, workload 
forecasting, human capital management, strategic planning, and 
employee skills tracking, among other topics. To gain further insight into 
NRC’s workload forecasting methods, strategic human capital 
management, and Project Aim implementation at the office level, we 
interviewed officials from the three selected major offices, two regions 
(Regions II and IV), the Office of Administration, and the Office of Nuclear 
Security and Incident Response. We selected these additional officials to 
interview to provide more diverse insights into NRC’s efforts. We selected 
Region II because it contains the states in which most of NRC’s new 
reactor work occurs, and Region IV oversees many state materials 
programs and several decommissioning reactors. We selected the Office 
of Administration because it includes several agency support functions. 
We selected the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 
because it is involved in, but does not lead, many NRC programs. 
Information gathered from interviews from these offices cannot be 
generalized to all of NRC. To identify criteria for evaluating the extent to 
which NRC’s strategic human capital efforts incorporate leading practices, 
we reviewed our prior work on key features and issues for federal 
agencies to consider in strategically managing their human capital.8 We 
                                                                                                                    
7NRC’s two other major offices are the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, 
and the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.  
8For additional information on our work on strategic human capital management, see 
http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/strategic_human_capital_management/issue_summary.  
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also reviewed government-wide guidance on strategic human capital 
management topics, such as the standards for internal control in the 
federal government;9 the Office of Personnel Management’s Human 
Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework;10 the Office of 
Management and Budget’s Circular A-11;11 and the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA 
Modernization Act.12 Using these sources, we selected six key practices 
that can help an agency strategically manage its human capital.13 We 
compared these practices to NRC’s strategic human capital efforts. 
We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to April 2017 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
 
This section discusses NRC’s organizational structure, the nuclear 
renaissance, and Project Aim. 
                                                                                                                    
9GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014). 
10Office of Personnel Management, The Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 
Framework: Systems, Standards and Metrics (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). The Office 
of Personnel Management has issued a final rule establishing a new Human Capital 
Framework, which will replace the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 
Framework, effective April 11, 2017. This rule is intended to align human capital 
management practices to broader agency strategic planning activities and better align 
human capital activities with an agency’s mission and strategic goals to enable agency 
leadership to better leverage the workforce to achieve results. 
11Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11 - Preparation, Submission, and 
Execution of the Budget, (Washington, D.C.: June 2015). 
12The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993); 
GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). 
13These six practices are: forecasting workload, setting workforce size and composition 
goals, identifying and tracking employee skills, aligning workforce with workload, training 
managers and supervisors on strategic human capital management, and assessing 
employees’ skills. We selected these practices because they were applicable to NRC 
planning efforts given the status of Project Aim implementation and were consistently 
identified in the reports and guidance we reviewed. 
Background 
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NRC is an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 to license and regulate civilian uses of nuclear materials in 
the United States for commercial, industrial, medical, and academic 
purposes.14 NRC is responsible for issuing licenses to commercial 
nuclear reactors and conducting oversight under such licenses to protect 
the health and safety of the public, among other things.15 NRC is 
authorized to conduct inspections and investigations and enforce 
regulatory requirements by, among other things, issuing orders, imposing 
civil (monetary) penalties, and revoking licenses. 
NRC is headed by a five-member Commission, with members appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and one Commissioner is 
designated by the President to serve as the Chair and official 
spokesperson. NRC is comprised of 28 offices located in headquarters 
and the regions, including 5 major program offices, 4 regional offices, and 
19 smaller offices. NRC staff from headquarters and the 4 regional offices 
conduct the agency’s regulatory development, licensing, operational 
experience, inspection, enforcement, and emergency response programs, 
among other responsibilities. The Commission as a whole formulates 
policies and regulations governing nuclear reactor and materials safety, 
issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates matters brought before it. The 
Executive Director for Operations carries out the policies and decisions of 
the Commission and is responsible for directing the activities of 15 offices 
to ensure that the commercial use of nuclear materials in the United 
States is safely conducted. In addition, NRC has an Office of the 
Inspector General, which is managed separately from the rest of the 
agency. 
For budget formulation purposes,16 NRC is organized by activity into 
seven programmatic business lines related to key regulatory groups of 
licensees. NRC’s seven programmatic business lines are: 
                                                                                                                    
14Pub. L. No. 93-438 (1974).  
15Pub. L. No. 83-703 (1975). 
16For additional information on NRC’s budget see GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Changes Planned to Budget Structure and Justification, GAO-17-294 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 8, 2017). 
NRC’s Organizational 
Structure 
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• Operating reactors, which regulates the nation’s civilian nuclear power 
reactors, as well as its research and test reactors, that create 
radiation for experiments in a wide variety of scientific fields. 
• New reactors, which performs technical reviews and provides 
oversight for the nuclear power plants currently under construction in 
the United States, and develops strategies to review applications for 
advanced reactor technologies that may be submitted in the future. 
• Fuel facilities, which licenses and regulates facilities that convert, 
enrich, and fabricate uranium to be used as fuel for nuclear reactors, 
and provides oversight for certain users of special nuclear material.17 
• Nuclear material users, which maintains the regulatory safety and 
security infrastructure needed to process and handle nuclear 
materials. It also oversees the Agreement State Program, under 
which NRC relinquishes some of its authority to license and regulate 
certain kinds of nuclear materials to the states. 
• Spent fuel storage and transportation, which performs technical 
reviews and inspections of storage, transportation, and shipments of 
spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials. 
• Decommissioning and low-level waste, which oversees the process 
by which a nuclear facility is safely removed from service, uranium 
recovery, and disposal of low-level radioactive waste, which are 
materials that either have become radioactive or have been 
contaminated with radioactive material. 
• High-level waste repository, which oversees activities associated with 
Department of Energy’s application to build an underground facility at 
Yucca Mountain to store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste from the nation’s nuclear weapons program.18 
NRC also has an agency-wide business line, Corporate Support, which 
includes support activities for the agency’s programmatic business lines, 
including acquisitions, administrative services, financial management, 
human resource management, information management, information 
technology, outreach, policy support, and associated training and travel. 
Corporate Support costs are allocated across the other business lines in 
                                                                                                                    
17Special nuclear material includes plutonium and types of uranium that are typically only 
mildly radioactive on their own, but that in concentrated form can be used as the primary 
ingredients of nuclear explosives.  
18NRC stopped requesting funds to support this activity after 2011 but spent funds 
remaining from prior years after 2011.  
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NRC’s budget. In addition to the business lines discussed above, NRC 
also has an Integrated University Program that supports university 
research and development in areas relevant to NRC’s mission and 
provides grants to support research projects that do not align with 
programmatic missions but are critical to maintaining the discipline of 
nuclear science and engineering. NRC also has an Office of the Inspector 
General. 
Each business line has an assigned lead office, which is the program 
office responsible for accomplishing a key component of NRC’s safety 
mission and its associated activities. For example, the Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation is the lead office for the operating reactor business 
line; the Office of New Reactors is the lead office for the new reactors 
business line; and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards is 
the lead office for the fuel facilities, high-level waste, and 
decommissioning and low-level waste business lines, among others. In 
fiscal year 2015, NRC obligated about $1 billion across the seven 
programmatic business lines, the Corporate Support business line, the 
Integrated University Program, and the Office of the Inspector General 
(see fig. 1). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Fiscal Year 2015 Obligations by Business Line 
 
Note: NRC’s business lines manage the agency’s activities with respect to key regulatory groups of 
licensees, as well as agencywide Corporate Support. In addition, the agency obligates money for its 
Integrated University Program and Office of the Inspector General. 
 
Each of the seven business lines, plus the Corporate Support business 
line, includes several broad product lines, or work activities, such as 
licensing, oversight, and rulemaking. Figure 2 shows the number of FTEs 
allocated to each of the product lines in fiscal year 2015. 
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Figure 2: Number of Actual Full-Time Equivalent Employees for the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s Work Activities, Fiscal Year 2015 
 
Note: For the purposes of this figure, we refer to categories of agency work performed under a 
business line as work activities. 
aCorporate Support is a business line that encompasses several activities: administrative services, 
financial management, human resource management, information management, information 
technology, outreach, policy support, training, travel, and acquisitions. For the purposes of this figure, 
these activities are consolidated and presented as the Corporate Support work activity. 
 
According to NRC documents, licensing and oversight of nuclear power 
reactors have been prominent activities of the NRC since its creation in 
1975. The intervening years have included periods of increased and 
decreased interest in the deployment and operation of commercial 
nuclear power reactors. Starting in 2001, there was increased interest in 
nuclear energy, due to the increased cost of fossil fuel energy and 
concerns about emissions from these energy sources. 
The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, with its tax incentives 
favoring additional nuclear energy development, contributed to increased 
interest in nuclear construction, among other things. Based on the nuclear 
power industry’s expressed intentions, NRC documents state that the 
The Nuclear Renaissance 
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agency was anticipating a large number of applications for new nuclear 
power plants, as well as facilities that create and process nuclear fuel and 
other new work. Beginning in 2005, the agency was authorized to 
considerably expand its budget and staff. In 2006, the anticipated 
increase in new reactor licensing workload led to the creation of a new 
office to manage the workload. Ultimately, NRC’s budget increased from 
$669.3 million in fiscal year 2005 to $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, while 
its workforce increased from 3,108 FTEs to 3,992 FTEs during the same 
time frame. However, changes in the economy—particularly a decline in 
natural gas prices—reduced the cost-effectiveness of constructing and 
operating nuclear power plants. In addition, the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident in March 2011 further eroded interest in pursuing construction 
and operation of new nuclear facilities in the United States and abroad.19 
Further, some new reactor applicants suspended or withdrew their 
applications, and licensees for several operating reactors began or 
announced plans for decommissioning before the expiration of their 
operating licenses. 
NRC’s workforce increased in anticipation of the increased workload and 
has been decreasing since 2011 (see fig. 3). Between 2005 and 2011, 
NRC increased its workforce by 884 FTEs, or about 28 percent, to a peak 
of about 3,992 FTEs. After it became clear that there would not be a 
proportional increase in workload, NRC began to reduce its workforce. 
According to an NRC official, NRC ended fiscal year 2016 with 3,549 
FTEs.20 For fiscal year 2017, NRC requested 3,525 FTEs, a decrease of 
75 FTEs from the target the Commission established for fiscal year 
2016.21 
                                                                                                                    
19The Fukushima Daiichi accident resulted from a prolonged loss of electrical power when 
a powerful earthquake triggered a tsunami wave that exceeded the plant’s seawall and 
flooded the site. 
20This FTE figure also includes reimbursable allocations, which are the number of FTEs 
funded by fees charged to other organizations for services provided by NRC, as well as 
those used by NRC’s Office of the Inspector General. For additional information on NRC’s 
fees see GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Regulatory Fee-Setting Calculations 
Need Greater Transparency, GAO-17-232 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2017).  
21The proposed staffing level in the fiscal year 2017 budget request does not incorporate 
additional reductions for 2016 and 2017 from NRC’s efforts to assess whether activities 
could be done later, with fewer resources, or not done at all, which NRC calls 
“rebaselining.” Including additional reductions from rebaselining would further reduce 
NRC’s FTE request for fiscal year 2017 to 3,405 FTEs—a decrease of 195 compared with 
the fiscal year 2016 target. 
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Figure 3: Total Allocated Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employees, Fiscal Years 2005 
through 2017 
 
Note: FTE data for fiscal year 2017 are the estimated levels from NRC’s Congressional budget 
justification, adjusted to reflect planned reductions in response to Project Aim. 
 
According to NRC budget documents, FTE levels varied within business 
lines from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2017, increasing in some 
business lines, and decreasing or staying flat in others (see fig. 4).22 
Increased FTE levels in the new reactors business line and, to a lesser 
extent, Corporate Support drove increases in NRC’s overall FTE levels. 
Specifically: 
• New reactors: In response to an anticipated increase in workload, the 
New Reactors business line was created in fiscal year 2006 with an 
FTE allocation of 156 and reached its peak size in fiscal year 2011 
with 758 FTEs. As it became clear that the nuclear renaissance that 
drove the office’s creation would not materialize, NRC decreased FTE 
                                                                                                                    
22We discuss NRC’s allocated FTE levels to allow for comparisons of data prior to fiscal 
year 2010 and after fiscal year 2015. Actual FTE levels for each business line during this 
period may differ, reflecting fact-of-life changes in workload. FTE data for fiscal year 2017 
are the estimated levels from NRC’s congressional budget justification, adjusted to reflect 
changes made in response to Project Aim. 
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allocations for the new reactors business line to 455 by fiscal year 
2017. 
• Corporate Support: FTE allocations for Corporate Support also 
increased during this period, from 626 FTEs in fiscal year 2005 to its 
peak of about 806 FTEs in fiscal year 2014, an increase of about 29 
percent. However, NRC began reducing FTEs for Corporate Support 
in fiscal year 2015. By fiscal year 2017, NRC had reduced its FTE 
allocations for Corporate Support to 718, 15 percent larger than its 
initial allocation in fiscal year 2005. 
• Operating reactors: FTE allocations for operating reactors were 
largely flat from fiscal year 2005 to 2016, at about 1,700 FTEs. 
However, these levels decreased to 1,601 FTEs in fiscal year 2017, or 
about 6 percent less than the business line’s allocation in fiscal year 
2005. 
• Materials: FTE levels for the five business lines that address materials 
and waste safety trended downward from their overall allocation of 
735 FTEs in fiscal year 2005 to 568 FTEs in fiscal year 2017, a 
reduction of about 23 percent.23 This reflects, among other things, the 
elimination of FTEs allocated to the high-level waste repository 
business line after the Department of Energy made a motion to 
withdraw its application for the Yucca Mountain facility in fiscal year 
2010. 
                                                                                                                    
23These five business lines are: fuel facilities, nuclear materials users, spent fuel storage 
and transportation, decommissioning and low-level waste, and the high-level waste 
repository. 
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Figure 4: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employees by Business Line, Fiscal Years 2005 through 
2017 
 
Note: FTE data for fiscal year 2017 are the estimated levels from NRC’s Congressional budget 
justification, adjusted to reflect changes made in response to Project Aim. This figure does not include 
NRC’s Inspector General Program, which was allocated 47 FTEs in fiscal year 2005 and 63 FTEs in 
fiscal year 2017 
aPrior to the fiscal year 2011 budget justification, activities that are now classified under the operating 
reactor business line were classified under the Nuclear Reactor Safety Program as licensing tasks, 
licensing renewal, reactor oversight, and incident response programs. 
bMaterials represents all activities that fall under the Nuclear Materials and Waste Safety Program, 
which includes the fuel facilities, nuclear materials users, decommissioning and low-level waste, 
spent fuel storage and transportation, and high-level waste repository business lines. 
cPrior to fiscal year 2011, activities that are now classified as Corporate Support were labeled as 
“infrastructure and support.” 
 
NRC has made plans to combine the Office of New Reactors and the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation by 2020, reflecting the decreased 
workload for the new and operating reactors business lines. However, the 
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combined FTE level for these two business lines is 356 FTEs higher in 
fiscal year 2017 than it was in 2005, an increase of about 21 percent.24 
 
Project Aim, which began in June 2014, was intended to identify ways in 
which NRC could improve efficiency, effectiveness, and agility and align 
its resources and workload in response to changes in the nuclear 
industry. According to the NRC staff’s February 2017 presentation to the 
Commission, NRC has completed all 19 of the major tasks from Project 
Aim. Completing several of the project’s tasks means that NRC has 
written plans or conducted evaluations, but the agency has not fully 
implemented the plans or recommendations stemming from these tasks. 
NRC has taken steps to implement the plans and recommendations, and 
in some cases implementation is ongoing. 
According to NRC’s 2015 Project Aim report, Project Aim focused on 
addressing four broad areas: (1) right-sizing the agency to have the right 
people with the right skills to accomplish the agency’s mission, (2) 
streamlining agency processes, (3) increasing timeliness of regulatory 
functions, and (4) establishing clearer agencywide priorities. NRC 
solicited recommendations from stakeholders and staff on how the 
agency might improve its effectiveness, efficiency, and agility in 
addressing these four broad areas. NRC’s Project Aim team analyzed 
recommendations from NRC staff and external stakeholders from other 
federal agencies and industry groups, among others, and provided a 
consolidated set of recommendations to the Commission for 
consideration. The recommendations approved by the Commission 
resulted in the creation of 19 Project Aim implementation tasks, which in 
some cases resulted in additional follow-on tasks, NRC officials said. 
The 19 Project Aim implementation tasks represent a broad array of 
activities. Examples of these tasks include business process 
improvements to the agency’s workflow and evaluations of certain agency 
functions, including consolidating some of NRC’s administrative 
operations, such as relocation, repairs, and computer support. In addition, 
several of Project Aim’s tasks were to create plans such as a transition 
plan for merging the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Office 
of New Reactors. Steps taken to implement the improvements and plans 
                                                                                                                    
24These figures include planned reductions in FTEs due to NRC’s rebaselining efforts. 
Project Aim 
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were not included within the scope of Project Aim, but according to NRC 
officials, the agency tracks the steps separately. 
Several of the Project Aim tasks provided a basis for the agency’s 
strategic human capital management that was not previously in place. For 
example, Project Aim called upon NRC to develop a strategic workforce 
plan that identified core mission-critical skills and competencies and 
outlined plans to match the agency’s people with those competencies. 
Project Aim further called on NRC to incorporate strategic workforce 
planning principles into the agency’s annual budgeting and planning 
processes. Other Project Aim implementation tasks focused on identifying 
mission-critical positions, creating a plan for developing competency 
models to assess the agency’s skill needs, and developing or enhancing 
existing training to meet those needs. 
 
NRC has taken steps to strategically manage its human capital, but some 
of these efforts have not incorporated some leading practices. First, NRC 
has not established long-term, agencywide goals for its workforce size or 
composition—the number of people with specific skillsets and levels of 
expertise—beyond the budget cycle. Second, NRC does not have 
information on employees’ skills, nor a system for tracking those skills. 
Third, NRC has provided limited training to managers and supervisors on 
strategic human capital management and assessing employees’ skillsets. 
 
 
 
NRC has taken steps through Project Aim and other efforts to 
strategically manage its human capital that support the agency’s ability to 
ensure it has the right size and composition of its workforce—that is, the 
number of people with specific skillsets and levels of expertise. Our prior 
work on strategic human capital management has identified certain 
activities or practices that can help an agency strategically manage its 
human capital, such as forecasting the agency’s incoming workload, 
aligning agency staff and skills with workload projections, identifying gaps 
and surpluses in agency staff and skill sets, conducting systematic 
assessments of current and future human capital, and aligning its 
NRC Has Taken 
Steps that Support 
Strategic Human 
Capital Management 
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Its Efforts 
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workforce with current and future needs.25 Key steps that NRC has taken 
to strategically manage its human capital are summarized below; 
additional information is in appendix I. 
Developing a strategic workforce plan. In February 2016, as part of 
Project Aim, NRC issued its first strategic workforce plan. The strategic 
workforce plan contains high-level information about the current 
workforce, the alignment between the workforce and future workload, and 
areas of the agency’s work where additional skills needs exist, among 
other topics. In January 2017, NRC issued a memorandum to establish a 
working group to enhance its strategic workforce planning process. 
According to the memorandum, this working group is expected to focus 
on improving NRC’s workload projection, skills identification, staffing, 
employee development, and other human capital planning tools. 
Conducting workload forecasting. Officials at the three major offices 
we interviewed conduct workload forecasting primarily to meet the needs 
of the 2-year federal budget cycle, but in some cases they forecast 
beyond this timeframe.26 While the specific methodologies for assessing 
the nuclear industry environment and forecasting workload differ across 
NRC offices, the methodologies typically incorporate several common 
data elements, including (1) historical workload and resource utilization 
data, (2) information from informal discussions with licensees and 
industry groups, and (3) data gathered from formal requests for 
information and letters of intent from licensees. 
Officials we interviewed from NRC’s three major offices said that their 
forecasting is typically limited to the 2-year budget cycle, and in some 
cases not more than a year, in part because licensees cannot predict the 
type or quantity of application submissions any further into the future. For 
example, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation officials said that their 
                                                                                                                    
25See, for example, GAO, Human Capital: Strategies to Help Agencies Meet Their 
Missions in an Era of Highly Constrained Resources, GAO-14-168 (Washington, D.C.: 
May 7, 2014), and GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce 
Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003) 
26The federal government assembles an annual budget through an administrative process 
of budget preparation and review. This process may take place several years before the 
budget for a particular fiscal year is ready to be submitted to Congress. This process 
typically starts in the spring of the year prior to the year the budget is submitted, and 2 
years prior to that budget being executed by the agency. For the purposes of this report 
we refer to this 2-year timeframe as the budget cycle. For additional information on NRC’s 
budget, see GAO-17-294. 
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workload for routine inspections is generally predictable since inspections 
require a predetermined number of samples to be taken, which takes a 
known number of hours to complete, thereby allowing the office to 
effectively forecast its workload of this type. However, these officials said 
that smaller projects, such as licensing amendments, cannot be predicted 
more than 1 year in advance. 
Despite the challenges of a sometimes unpredictable workload, in some 
cases offices have taken steps to forecast beyond the 2-year budget 
cycle, and have made associated workforce adjustments to 
accommodate the incoming workload. For example, since 2008, the 
Office of New Reactors has performed annual assessments of incoming 
workload that forecast 5 years into the future. In 2014, the Office of New 
Reactors used one of these 5-year assessments to identify an expected 
decrease in incoming workload that led to an anticipated decrease of 
about 26 percent of the FTEs needed for certain work activities. To adjust 
to the change in workload, officials decided not to backfill positions as 
staff left the division, among other strategies, and reduced the division’s 
staffing level by 20 percent, according to NRC officials. 
Developing and analyzing staffing plans. According to NRC officials, 
office-level managers are responsible for creating annual staffing plans 
that identify where they have too many or not enough FTEs—referred to 
as surpluses and vacancies—in relation to the office’s estimated incoming 
workload.27 NRC collected its first set of surplus and vacancy data in 
2015. However, according to the strategic workforce plan, the data could 
not be used to determine whether the skills of NRC’s workforce would 
meet mission demands due to the low quality of the data. Additionally, as 
a result of Project Aim’s task to create a strategic workforce plan, in 2015 
the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer requested that all NRC 
offices submit supplementary workforce planning narratives annually with 
their staffing plans to provide insight into workload changes and 
corresponding workforce needs 3 to 5 years into the future. 
Developing competency models. In 2016, NRC began a pilot project to 
develop competency models that articulate the skills employees need to 
fulfill the functions of their positions. These models could provide 
information on the skills needed to perform each position’s functions, and 
                                                                                                                    
27NRC defines surpluses as positions that currently are, or are expected to be, no longer 
needed to meet work demands of the agency, and vacancies as positions that are open 
and need employees with specific skillsets to meet current or future work demands. 
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the training needed to develop those skills. NRC officials said that the 
agency has additional qualifications for many positions that are specific to 
office-level work, and they said that many managers and supervisors are 
generally knowledgeable regarding the skillsets and qualifications 
required to perform the work in their work units.28 NRC officials said the 
competency modeling project includes piloting a system that can include 
employee skills. As of July 2016, NRC had completed 4 of the 30 to 50 
competency models that officials estimate they will need to account for all 
of the agency’s positions. If the pilot project shows that competency 
models are a viable alternative to the current process for training 
employees in new skills, officials said that expansion to the wider NRC 
workforce would begin in late fiscal year 2018 at the earliest. 
Reprioritizing work activities. To reduce resources allocated to low-
priority workload areas, NRC performed a one-time agencywide 
prioritization and rebaselining effort under Project Aim. Within this effort, 
NRC developed an agencywide framework to assess all NRC activities 
with more than 10 FTEs to determine if, for example, these activities 
could be done later, done with fewer resources, or not done at all. 
Rebaselining resulted in a plan to cut 150 low-priority activities, thereby 
reducing NRC’s contractor support by $18 million and agency staff by 185 
FTEs. As of February 2017, NRC had made 138 of the 150 proposed cuts 
to low-priority activities, resulting in a reduction of 147 FTEs. 
Cross-training employees. To manage the size and composition of the 
agency’s workforce, NRC is training existing staff in new skill areas, which 
NRC refers to as cross-training. NRC’s strategic workforce plan states 
that retraining existing staff in new skill areas can be an especially useful 
strategy to develop individuals occupying surplus positions. 
 
NRC has not established longer term agencywide goals for its workforce 
size or composition because NRC’s efforts have generally focused in the 
2-year budget cycle. In general, NRC determines the workforce size 
through the budgeting process, and it determines the workforce 
composition—that is, the number of people with specific skillsets and 
levels of expertise—for offices through the staffing planning process. 
Federal guidance and leading practices emphasize the importance of 
                                                                                                                    
28NRC could not provide information on how many positions or employees are covered by 
these office-level qualifications because this information is not tracked at the agency level. 
NRC Has Not Established 
Longer Term Agencywide 
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forward-thinking planning to, among other things, help identify and close 
skill gaps. Without workforce size and composition goals that extend 
beyond the 2-year budget cycle, NRC is at risk of not having the right size 
and mix of skills needed to meet the demand for its services, nor the time 
needed to develop or obtain employees with the skills needed to 
complete future workloads. 
NRC determines its workforce size goals 1 fiscal year in advance as part 
of the agency’s annual budgeting process. However, NRC does not have 
goals for agency size beyond the 2-year budget cycle. NRC’s Project Aim 
report presented a target of a 10 percent reduction in FTEs and budget by 
fiscal year 2020, which would have led to a staff size of about 3,400. 
However, NRC officials stated on several occasions that the target cited 
in the Project Aim report was not a planned reduction, but a general level 
intended to assist in planning and to act as a driver to improve the 
efficiency mindset of staff. 
As mentioned previously, individual offices have taken some steps to 
gather data to forecast future workload to inform decisions about future 
workforce needs through each office’s staffing plan.29 Office-level officials 
develop their staffing plans to identify the composition of their office’s 
workforce, within the limits of staffing level allocations set by the Office of 
the Chief Financial Officer based on the agency’s budget. In fiscal year 
2015, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer began requesting 
information from offices on surpluses and vacancies, among other 
information, in an attempt to enhance its staffing planning process. 
However, according to the strategic workforce plan, differences in how 
the offices defined key terms led to low-quality data for fiscal year 2015 
that could not be used for analysis. To correct this, the Office of the Chief 
Human Capital Officer updated the definitions for key terms for the fiscal 
year 2016 staffing plans. According to an NRC official, an analysis of the 
fiscal year 2017 staffing plan data was presented in November 2016.This 
analysis described certain NRC staffing and attrition trends and the 
agency’s current efforts to identify and reduce overage positions. This 
                                                                                                                    
29NRC has not performed workload forecasts for its Corporate Support business line, a 
business line for agencywide support activities, which include acquisitions, administrative 
services, financial management, human resource management, information management, 
information technology, outreach, policy support, and associated training and travel. 
These support activities account for about one-third of NRC’s budget. According to an 
NRC official, NRC has not performed workload forecasting for Corporate Support because 
this business line depends on the other offices to work with industry to forecast licensing 
activities.  
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analysis also identified some next steps for NRC’s strategic workforce 
planning efforts, including refining NRC’s ability to accurately identify 
overage positions and identifying positions where future vacancies may 
exist to redeploy overages based on historical attrition, among other 
things. 
NRC’s future workload can be difficult to forecast, according to NRC 
officials, because variations in the type and amount of incoming workload 
could change the size and composition of the workforce needed to 
address it. For example, NRC documents state that workload is shifting 
from the operating reactors business line towards decommissioned 
reactors after an increase in the number of reactors decommissioning 
before the end of their licenses. According to NRC officials, 
decommissioning a power reactor typically leads to a reduction of 4 FTEs 
in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and an increase of 1 FTE in 
the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards’ Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, leading to a 
net reduction of 3 FTEs for the agency as a whole. Furthermore, NRC 
documents acknowledge that NRC is operating in a budgetary 
environment that will continue to place downward pressure on staffing, 
making the agency smaller in the future, and lead to continued reductions 
in Corporate Support and overages in staff. However, when workloads 
shift, it can take a considerable amount of resources to identify, hire, and 
train employees, which can make it difficult for an agency to respond. For 
example, NRC’s program for training probabilistic risk assessment 
analysts—a mission-critical occupation required in several of NRC’s 
offices—takes 3 years to complete. This indicates that the budget cycle, 
which typically covers 2 years, may be too short a timeframe to adapt the 
workforce to the incoming workload, which puts NRC at risk of not having 
the right workforce size and mix of skills needed to meet the demand for 
its services or the time needed to develop or obtain employees with the 
skills needed to complete future workloads. NRC officials we interviewed 
told us that improved forecasting methods need to be incorporated into 
agency decision-making processes in order to determine how many 
employees with specific skill sets NRC needs for future agency 
operations. 
Further, NRC has not developed agencywide goals for the composition of 
its workforce. The Project Aim report includes statements that indicate 
that in 2020, the composition of the agency’s workforce in its program 
offices is expected to be fairly similar to the numbers, grades, and 
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competencies of the NRC employees in 2005 because NRC’s work will 
be similar to that of 2005.30 NRC officials said that this information is not 
being used as a goal and that there is no plan in place to achieve this 
workforce composition. Even if this were to be used as a goal, several 
other factors differentiate NRC’s current and anticipated workload from 
what it was in 2005. For example, in 2005, NRC regulated 104 operating 
and 35 research and test reactors; in 2016, this number had been 
reduced to 100 operating and 31 research and test reactors. Since 2005, 
NRC has also experienced a similar decline in other areas of the 
agency’s workload, such as decommissioning of research and test 
reactors and complex materials sites. As a result, the composition of the 
workforce needed in 2020 may well be different than it was in 2005. 
Federal guidance emphasizes the importance of forward-thinking 
planning. According to NRC officials and the Project Aim report, NRC 
agrees with this concept, and NRC’s strategic workforce plan states that 
early forecasting of the nuclear environment and taking early action to 
prepare for it are the keys to ensuring staff are adequately prepared for 
the future workload.31 The Office of Management and Budget states in its 
guidance for preparing agency budgets that the agency’s Chief Human 
Capital Officer is responsible for overseeing forward-thinking workforce 
planning and analysis within fiscal restraints, including identifying and 
continuously working to close skill gaps in mission-critical occupations, 
among others, and using effective hiring and workforce development 
strategies.32 Office of Personnel Management guidance states that 
agencies should have documented evidence of a current agency human 
capital plan that includes human capital goals, performance measures, 
and milestones, among other components.33 Finally, principles we 
identified for effective strategic workforce planning state that agencies 
                                                                                                                    
30The Office of Personnel Management, which is responsible for administering and 
overseeing the federal government’s classification system for defining and organizing 
federal positions, organized the work of the government into 15 grades, which are the 
numerical designations based on the complexity of the work and knowledge required to do 
the job. Generally, grades are assigned by using a point system based on the position’s 
degree of difficulty, responsibility, and qualifications.  
31Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Strategic Workforce Plan, (Rockville, MD: Feb. 4, 
2016). 
32Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11 - Preparation, Submission, and 
Execution of the Budget, (Washington, D.C.: June 2015). 
33Office of Personnel Management, The Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 
Framework: Systems, Standards and Metrics (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).  
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should develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and 
retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals, and monitor and evaluate 
the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals.34 Setting forward-
thinking workforce goals early is particularly important for NRC since the 
specialized skills needed to do the agency’s work can take years of 
training to learn. Setting exact targets for overall workforce size and skills 
composition into the future can be complicated, but if NRC is not able to 
develop specific numbers for these goals, identifying goals as a range 
could help NRC better ensure that it has the right mix of skills needed to 
complete future workloads. 
Without agency-wide workforce size or composition goals beyond the 2-
year budget cycle, NRC risks not being prepared for its future workload 
and cannot ensure that it has the right number of people, with the right 
skills, at the right time to meet future workforce demands. NRC’s recent 
focus has been on reducing the size of its workforce. However, without 
goals for future workforce and composition needs—either in exact 
numbers or as a range—NRC could reach a point at which it is reducing 
the number of staff when it needs to be increasing the numbers either in 
specific skill areas, as an agency, or both. 
 
NRC does not currently have comprehensive employee skills information 
because it does not have a systematic approach or system to track this 
information. According to NRC’s Project Aim report, “The agency does 
not have an automated strategic workforce planning tool to manage the 
talent pipeline. Consequently, supervisors rely on past experience and 
the grapevine to be aware of employees with the skills and talents 
necessary to accomplish the work.”35 Furthermore, the strategic 
workforce plan states that it was evident that competency and skill 
information for staff was not readily available during NRC’s effort to 
identify strategies for managing its workforce and minimizing staff 
overages and skill gaps. The plan further notes that NRC needs this 
                                                                                                                    
34GAO-04-39.  
35Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Achieving Exemplary Nuclear Regulation in the 21st 
Century, Report on Project Aim 2020 (Rockville, MD: Jan. 30, 2015).  
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information in order to align the workforce with the agency’s current and 
projected needs.36 
NRC had a system to track employee skills that it largely abandoned in 
2008 due to difficulties with the system. According to NRC officials, the 
system was difficult for users and managers to navigate, allowed 
employees to embellish their skills, and did not include tools for managers 
to verify information submitted by employees.37 The agency’s strategic 
workforce plan included a task to reassess whether the previous skills 
tracking system could be used again on a more limited basis to house 
skill and competency information. NRC completed the assessment and 
concluded that the resources required to restore the system were greater 
than the benefit the system would provide. NRC officials we interviewed 
also said that the agency’s management understood agency staffing 
surpluses and vacancies well enough that having a system is not 
necessary.38 However, NRC is testing a new skills tracking system to 
measure progress of those trained under the new competency model pilot 
project, which began in 2016. NRC officials said that the new system 
could be used to enhance NRC’s ability to track employee skills if the pilot 
project for expanding the competency models proves successful and the 
officials can make a business case for expanding the pilot. Even if NRC 
decides to adopt competency models for the entire agency after the pilot 
concludes in 2018, the project timeline indicates that it will be several 
years before the agency is able to develop and use the new skills tracking 
system across the agency. 
The limited availability of employee skills data at NRC may affect the 
agency’s ability to make informed decisions about a variety of human 
capital management strategies that could help the agency strategically 
manage its size and composition and better align agency staff with 
projected workload. One NRC senior official we interviewed said that 
without a comprehensive tool with a reliable and up-to-date employee 
skills database, the agency’s ability to identify and mitigate critical skills 
gaps could become disjointed and cumbersome to navigate. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                    
36Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Strategic Workforce Plan (Rockville, MD: Feb.4, 
2016).  
37NRC’s technical training center continues to use the system on a limited basis.  
38NRC defines surpluses as positions that currently are, or are expected to be, no longer 
needed to meet work demands of the agency, and it defines vacancies as positions that 
are open and need employees with specific skillsets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 25 GAO-17-233  Strategic Human Capital Management 
an NRC union representative expressed concern that NRC is making 
staffing reductions that are not informed by information about employees’ 
skills. As stated in NRC’s strategic workforce plan, “With the decline in 
budget and staffing levels, as well as other ongoing initiatives, the future 
workforce challenge is to enhance the NRC’s capability to reshape and 
redeploy staff where and when they are needed. In the short-term we will 
have more permanent staff on-board than the budget or workload would 
support.” 
One key principle we identified for effective strategic workforce planning 
emphasizes that it is essential for agencies to determine the critical skills 
and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future 
programmatic results, particularly as changes in national security, 
technology, and the budget occur.39 If an agency knows what skills its 
employees have, it can more readily ensure it can identify staff in need of 
additional training, as well as which employees have the skillsets needed 
for specialized or highly technical work. Additionally, according to leading 
practices for government human capital management, such as the Office 
of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Assessment and 
Accountability Framework, agency human capital decisions regarding 
recruitment, retention, development, and aligning workforce 
competencies with current and future agency needs should be guided by 
data-driven, results-oriented planning and accountability systems.40 The 
skills tracking system that NRC is developing as part of the agencywide 
competency modeling pilot project could improve the availability of 
employee skills information for the agency. However, implementation of 
this system is several years away and is contingent on the approval of the 
business case in favor of expanding the project. According to officials, 
NRC does not currently have plans to develop a system to capture 
employee skills information if the business case is not approved.  
Without a systematic, comprehensive approach to tracking employee 
skills information, the agency cannot ensure that the right personnel for 
the job are on board or will be in the future, or that it is making informed, 
data-driven strategic human capital management decisions about its 
workforce. This information is particularly important because many human 
capital decisions are already being made within the context of NRC’s 
                                                                                                                    
39GAO-04-39. 
40Office of Personnel Management, The Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 
Framework: Systems, Standards and Metrics (Washington, D.C.: March, 2006).  
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organizational changes of reducing staff by hundreds of people. If not 
carefully managed, imprecise reductions could cause NRC to miss 
efficiencies in matching staff skills with expected workload. NRC 
established a working group for strategic workforce planning in January 
2017 that is expected to address some of these topics; however, NRC 
established the group as we were completing our review, and it is too 
soon to tell what recommendations, if any, the group will make to help the 
agency address the need to identify employee skills and match them with 
expected workload. 
 
In some cases, managers and supervisors are not familiar with strategic 
human capital management or assessing employees’ skillsets because 
NRC has not provided managers or supervisors with consistent training. 
According to NRC officials, strategic human capital management is new 
to NRC since Project Aim was undertaken in 2014, and in some cases 
those in charge of executing it are not trained on how to implement it. The 
strategic workforce plan was the first of its kind for the agency. NRC 
officials said that until recently, strategic workforce planning had not been 
done at an agency level; rather, it has been done in isolation by offices, 
with the exception of a Quarterly Performance Review meeting during 
which NRC’s leadership discusses agency priorities. Other NRC officials 
said that prior to the rebaselining project, individual office leads knew 
what the priorities were for their own offices, but the agency as a whole 
did not set priorities. NRC human capital officials said that NRC 
managers are responsible for skills management and rely on branch 
chiefs—who typically supervise 6 to 16 employees—to assess staff 
competencies and workforce composition and to identify critical skill gaps. 
NRC human capital officials said that workforce planning is a new 
concept to some of the agency’s branch chiefs, who are typically trained 
in technical areas, but receive training only at a high level on how to do 
strategic human capital management. Officials said that NRC provides 
supervisory training that includes high-level information on components of 
workforce planning, succession planning, employee development, and 
position management during a one-week course taken by new 
supervisors through the Office of Personnel Management, and NRC is in 
the process of developing a refresher course on related topics. The 
course for new supervisors covers human capital management, among 
other topics, but officials said that not all supervisors are fully comfortable 
with these responsibilities, and the application of these strategic human 
capital management approaches is inconsistent. Furthermore, this 
training is limited to new supervisors and is not tailored to NRC’s 
Managers and 
Supervisors Have 
Received Limited Training 
on Strategic Human 
Capital Management 
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specialized skills needs or its current environment of organizational 
change. 
Senior human capital officials confirmed that the agency has an 
inconsistent approach to training managers and supervisors on strategic 
human capital management. They said that some supervisors spend a lot 
of time with the staff and know their skills, while others do not. They also 
said that NRC’s workforce management panel has been an effective tool 
for identifying people to move to other positions on an informal basis,41 
but that the agency is beginning to focus on equipping supervisors to 
have conversations with staff about moving to new areas of work within 
the organization. NRC officials said this new focus could contribute to 
more consistent application of strategic human capital management 
approaches.  
Federal internal control standards specify that for employees to be 
considered competent they must be qualified to carry out their assigned 
responsibilities.42 Competence requires relevant knowledge, skills, and 
abilities, which are gained largely from professional experience, training, 
and certifications. However, some managers and supervisors may not be 
able to fully carry out their strategic human capital management 
responsibilities because they have not been trained in depth on strategic 
human capital management or assessing employee skillsets. NRC’s 
strategic human capital management approach relies heavily on the 
agency’s ability to identify employees’ skills, train them in new areas, and 
move them to new positions if needed. If all managers and supervisors do 
not consistently perform these functions well, NRC may be unable to 
adjust its workforce appropriately and efficiently or ensure that the agency 
has people with the skillsets it needs. If some managers and supervisors 
have limited knowledge of their employees’ skillsets, they will not be able 
to properly identify those best fit for additional training and movement 
within the agency. 
 
Starting in 2005, the anticipation of a nuclear renaissance led to a large 
increase in NRC’s budget and staff levels, as well as changes to the 
                                                                                                                    
41In 2015, NRC created a panel to assist in workforce management, particularly with 
regard to external hiring; this panel includes deputy office directors and a deputy regional 
administrator. For more information on the workforce management panel, see appendix I. 
42GAO-14-704G.  
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relative sizes of different NRC offices; these changes were intended to 
meet expected growth and changes to the domestic nuclear power 
sector. When it became clear that the nuclear renaissance was not 
unfolding as expected and that, in fact, some nuclear power plants were 
unexpectedly being retired, NRC began to take some steps to actively 
reduce the size and change the composition of its workforce. After 
growing by 884 FTEs (28 percent) from 2005 to 2011, NRC has reduced 
its workforce by 587 FTEs as of 2017, leaving it about 10 percent larger 
than it was in 2005. NRC has stated that it expects to shrink further, but it 
does not have clear goals with respect to its appropriate workforce size or 
composition. Trends in the nuclear power sector will likely continue to 
change the ideal size and composition of the agency’s workforce. In the 
future, workloads could increase, decrease, or shift to new areas that 
could require a different mix of skills and number of staff. However, 
without effective strategic human capital management, NRC cannot 
determine the appropriate size and composition of the agency’s workforce 
now or in the future. 
We identified three areas where NRC’s efforts do not fully incorporate 
leading practices that could help NRC be better prepared to respond to 
future workload changes and manage its human capital more 
strategically. First, NRC has not developed agencywide workforce size or 
composition goals to meet its future workload beyond the 2-year budget 
cycle. NRC has been reducing its staffing levels in recent years, but 
without goals for future workforce and composition needs—in exact 
numbers or as a range—NRC may be reducing the number of staff when 
it needs to be increasing their numbers either in specific skill areas, as an 
agency, or both. Also, the budget cycle may be too short a timeframe to 
adapt the workforce to changes in the nuclear environment and incoming 
workload, putting NRC at risk of not having the right workforce size and 
mix of skills needed to meet the demand for its services or not having the 
time needed to develop or obtain employees with the skills needed to 
complete future workloads. Second, NRC has started to make decisions 
about moving or retraining employees to fill vacant positions, but it has 
not established a systematic, comprehensive approach to track 
information on employees’ skills. NRC is undertaking a pilot program 
through 2018 that, if successful, could lead to such a tracking system. 
However, NRC does not have a plan to establish a tracking system for 
employee skills outside of the pilot program. Without such a system to 
track employee skills, NRC cannot ensure that it is making data-driven 
decisions that ensure the agency has the right personnel on board and 
that make the best use of its workforce. Further, if not carefully managed, 
imprecise reductions could cause NRC to miss efficiencies in matching 
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staff skills with expected workload. Third, NRC is relying on managers 
and supervisors to, for example, properly identify employees to transfer or 
retrain from surplus to vacancy positions, but they have not been fully 
trained or may not be comfortable implementing NRC’s strategic human 
capital management efforts and assessing employees’ skillsets. If NRC 
does not provide managers and supervisors with the appropriate training, 
NRC may not be able to adjust its workforce appropriately or efficiently. 
 
To improve NRC’s ability to strategically manage the size and 
composition of its workforce and respond to changes in the nuclear 
industry, we recommend that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission take the following three actions: 
• Set agencywide goals, which could be ranges, for overall workforce 
size and skills composition that extend beyond the 2-year budget 
cycle. 
• Establish a systematic, comprehensive approach for tracking 
employee skills information, either through the system developed 
through the competency modeling pilot program or some other 
system. 
• Consistently train managers and supervisors in strategic human 
capital management and assessing employee skillsets. 
  
Recommendations for 
Executive Action 
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We provided a draft of this report to NRC for review and comment. NRC 
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II. In its 
written comment, NRC generally agreed with our recommendations. NRC 
also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 
 
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 
the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 
 
Frank Rusco 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment 
Agency Comments 
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken steps through 
Project Aim and other efforts to strategically manage its human capital 
that support the agency’s ability to have the right size and composition of 
its workforce —that is, the number of people with specific skillsets and 
levels of expertise. These steps include: 
Developing a strategic workforce plan. In February 2016, as part of 
Project Aim, NRC issued its first strategic workforce plan (the plan). The 
official with primary responsibility for developing the plan said that the 
new planning process is intended to ensure that the agency responds 
more conservatively than it did in 2005, when it hired an additional 500 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees per year in response to a nuclear 
renaissance that never materialized. The plan contains high-level 
information about the current workforce, the alignment between the 
workforce and future workload, and areas of the agency’s work where 
additional skills needs exist, among other topics. The official also said that 
the plan’s purposes are (1) to be a one-time plan to identify core mission-
critical skills and competencies and match the agency’s people with those 
competencies, and (2) to develop a process for incorporating strategic 
workforce planning principles into management’s annual budgeting and 
planning. According to the official, the strategic workforce planning team 
determined that NRC has most of the mission-critical skills it needs. 
However, the team identified six areas where the agency lacks either the 
breadth or depth of skills needed for future workload. In addition, the 
official said, strategic workforce planning will be institutionalized through 
the use of templates used to guide annual staffing plans. The plan 
acknowledges that the agency’s strategic workforce planning is limited in 
its sophistication but that NRC intends to use an iterative approach to 
systematically advance the level of sophistication of its strategic 
workforce planning commensurate with the needs of the agency. 
Conducting workload forecasting. Officials at the three major offices 
we interviewed—the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of 
New Reactors, and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards—conduct workload forecasting primarily to meet the needs of 
the 2-year federal budget cycle, but in some cases they forecast beyond 
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this timeframe.1 While the specific methodologies for assessing the 
nuclear industry environment and forecasting workload differ across NRC 
offices, the methodologies typically incorporate common data elements, 
which are used to develop workload forecasts: 
• Historical workload and resource utilization data. NRC offices use 
several kinds of historical workload and resource utilization data to 
develop workload forecasts, including data on the average number of 
new license and license amendment applications received per year; 
the amount and distribution of staff time needed to process those 
applications; and the number of actions proposed, but not applied for 
by licensees in a year. For example, the Office of New Reactors uses 
historical data to estimate its staffing and contract needs per project 
by month for the design phase of licensing a nuclear reactor. NRC 
officials we interviewed said that this establishes a baseline resource 
estimate that they use for budget formulation, though the actual 
resources used during a licensing review vary based on the quality 
and timeliness of information that the applicant submits to the Office 
of New Reactors, as well as any requests by the applicant to suspend 
or slow down the review for business reasons. 
• Information from informal discussions with licensees and industry 
groups. According to NRC officials, offices frequently gather 
information from current and prospective licensees on their business 
plans and anticipated requests for licensing actions through informal 
discussions between NRC project managers and licensees, working 
groups, and conference attendance, among other sources. For 
example, officials said NRC project managers make annual requests 
for information about licensees’ business plans and routinely conduct 
informal discussions with the vice presidents of licensee companies 
regarding potential changes to their business plans. 
• Data gathered from formal requests for information and letters of 
intent from licensees. NRC officials said that offices make formal 
requests for information from licensees to help the offices fine tune 
their baseline workload forecasts made using historical data. 
Specifically, some offices within NRC conduct surveys of licensees 
                                                                                                                    
1The federal government assembles an annual budget through an administrative process 
of budget preparation and review. This process may take place several years before the 
budget for a particular fiscal year is ready to be submitted to Congress. This process 
typically starts in the spring of the year prior to the year the budget is submitted, and 2 
years prior to that budget being executed by the agency. For the purposes of this report 
we refer to this 2 year timeframe as the budget cycle.  
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about their business plans and licensing actions that they plan to 
submit to the agency for review. For example, every 2 years, the 
Office of New Reactors sends out a survey to licensees requesting 
information on new reactors. NRC officials then work with business 
development staff of the potential licensee to develop a schedule for 
the associated licensing work. NRC officials said NRC uses this 
schedule to make sure it has people with the correct skillsets on hand 
to complete the work. In addition, licensees sometimes submit to NRC 
courtesy letters of intent, for example, when they plan to undertake 
new construction or amend their licenses. 
Officials we interviewed from NRC’s three major offices said that their 
forecasting is typically limited to the 2-year budget cycle, and in some 
cases not more than a year, in part because licensees cannot predict the 
type or quantity of application submissions any further into the future. For 
example, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation officials said that their 
workload for routine inspections is generally predictable since inspections 
require a predetermined number of samples to be taken, which takes a 
known number of hours to complete, thereby allowing the office to 
effectively forecast its workload of this type. However, these officials said 
that smaller projects, such as licensing amendments, cannot be predicted 
more than 1 year in advance. Similarly, NRC officials we interviewed told 
us that the nuclear materials workload can be unpredictable because 
these business lines work with large numbers of small licensees that may 
or may not apply for licenses depending on market conditions. For 
example, the officials said that uranium recovery firms are highly sensitive 
to the price of uranium; if the price of uranium increases, uranium 
recovery becomes more lucrative and may prompt additional firms to 
enter the market, increasing the likelihood that NRC will receive additional 
uranium recovery work. Conversely, the officials said that if the price of 
uranium decreases, NRC will likely see a decrease in its uranium 
recovery workload. In contrast, officials from the Office of New Reactors 
told us that because some projects have long timeframes, require 
extensive planning, and can cost millions of dollars to build, licensees 
know up to 4 years in advance that they plan to submit an application to 
NRC. 
NRC’s Project Aim report included an implementation task to develop a 
process for conducting workload forecasting in support of the budgeting 
process and 4-year strategic plan revisions. However, the Commission 
did not approve the task because, according to NRC officials, (1) they 
were not comfortable nor familiar with workload forecasting techniques; 
(2) they considered forecasting to be too hypothetical and chose to focus 
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resources on concrete and near-term objectives, particularly those that 
may occur during the 2-year budget cycle; and (3) they considered the 
budget formulation process to be sound, though they had reservations 
about individual components of the process. The Commission instead 
recommended that offices incorporate the lessons of Project Aim into 
existing workload forecasting efforts. NRC officials we interviewed told us 
that improved forecasting methods need to be incorporated into agency 
decision-making processes in order to determine how many employees 
with specific skill sets are needed for future agency operations. NRC 
officials also said that they need to know future workload demands in 
order to properly coordinate and train contractors and supplement staff 
from the national labs for work in which NRC’s existing expertise is 
limited. 
Despite the challenges of a sometimes unpredictable workload, in some 
cases offices have taken steps to forecast beyond the 2-year budget 
cycle, and have made associated workforce adjustments to 
accommodate the incoming workload. For example, since 2008, the 
Office of New Reactors has conducted annual assessments of incoming 
workload that forecast 5 years into the future. These assessments allow a 
company to tell NRC that it plans to either submit an application for a new 
reactor design in the near future, identify a site to be considered for a new 
reactor, or notify NRC of an anticipated application for combining a 
license. NRC officials said that they then consider the impacts of this 
information on their workload, using it to identify future technical needs—
such as resident inspectors, geologists, or seismologists—and prepare 
for those needs. For example, in 2014, the Office of New Reactors used 
one of these 5-year assessments to anticipate a 26 percent FTE 
reduction primarily in flood and seismic work activities. NRC officials said 
they adjusted to the change in workload by using strategies such as not 
backfilling positions as staff left the division in order to reduce the 
division’s staffing level by 20 percent. Similarly, from 2003 to 2009, the 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards received many letters of 
intent from prospective licensees to apply for new uranium enrichment 
facilities several years before the planned submittal dates. Officials said 
that they increased staffing levels in the office and partner offices during 
the subsequent 3 to 5 years by using NRC staff and contractors to assist 
with these new licensing application reviews. As the number of new 
applications and operating licensees later decreased, NRC officials 
allowed the staff levels within the office and partner offices to decrease. 
Developing and analyzing staffing plans. According to NRC officials, 
office-level managers are responsible for creating annual staffing plans 
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that identify where they have too many or not enough FTEs—referred to 
as surpluses and vacancies—in relation to the office’s estimated incoming 
workload. This process is conducted about a year after the budget for the 
office has been determined and after FTE allocations for the year have 
been made. For example, an office could include in its staffing plan that it 
has a surplus of reactor inspectors or project managers in a specific area, 
such as environmental reviews. These 26 office-level staffing plans are 
submitted to the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, which is 
responsible for reviewing, aggregating, and analyzing them. The Office of 
the Chief Human Capital Officer then conducts a comprehensive 
assessment that focuses on several human capital indicators, including 
surpluses and vacancies, the supervisor-to-staff ratio, and grade levels. 
NRC conducted its first collection of surplus and vacancy data in 2015. 
However, according to the strategic workforce plan, the Office of the Chief 
Human Capital Officer could not use the data to determine whether the 
skills of NRC’s workforce would meet mission demands due to 
differences in how offices had defined surpluses and vacancies, which 
resulted in low-quality data. NRC has since created standardized 
definitions to be used agencywide to promote a more consistent 
approach. According to an NRC official, an analysis of the 2017 staffing 
plan data was presented in November 2016.This analysis described 
certain NRC staffing and attrition trends and NRC’s current efforts to 
quickly identify and reduce overage positions. This analysis also identified 
some next steps for NRC’s strategic workforce planning efforts, including 
refining NRC’s ability to accurately identify overage positions and 
identifying positions where future vacancies may exist to redeploy 
overages based on historical attrition, among other things. 
Additionally, as a result of Project Aim’s task to create a strategic 
workforce plan, in 2015 the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer 
requested that all NRC offices submit a supplementary workforce 
planning narrative annually with their staffing plans to provide insight into 
future workload changes and corresponding workforce needs 3 to 5 years 
into the future. These narratives required each office to update workload 
assumptions discussed in Project Aim, provide information on how these 
changes might impact the office’s ability to meet the workload, and 
describe any internal workforce needs that may result in changes to the 
office’s staff and resource needs. NRC documents state that these 
narratives are used to help NRC proactively identify and mitigate potential 
critical skill gaps before they happen and inform future iterations of the 
strategic workforce plan. 
 
Appendix I: Information on Steps Taken by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
Strategically Manage its Human Capital 
 
 
 
 
Page 36 GAO-17-233  Strategic Human Capital Management 
Developing competency models. In 2016, NRC began a pilot project to 
develop competency models that articulate the skills employees need to 
fulfill the functions of their positions. These models could provide 
information on the positions the agency has, the skills needed to perform 
each position’s functions, and the training needed to develop those skills. 
These models are in addition to the agency-level qualifications, which 
include educational requirements, that NRC has developed for 37 of its 
positions and that cover about 500 NRC employees. In addition, NRC 
officials said that the agency has additional qualifications for many 
positions that are specific to office-level work, and that many managers 
and supervisors are generally knowledgeable regarding the skillsets and 
qualifications required to perform the work in their work units.2 NRC 
officials said the competency modeling project includes piloting a system 
that can include employee skills. As of July 2016, NRC had completed 4 
of the 30 to 50 competency models officials estimate they will need to 
account for all of the agency’s positions, and officials said they do not 
know how many additional models they intend to complete in the future. 
Each of the 4 competency models that have already been developed 
contain 23 associated skills, and each skill specifies 5 levels of 
proficiency (see fig. 5). NRC officials said that they plan to finish the pilot 
project in the summer of fiscal year 2018, and if a business case for 
developing additional competency models is approved, NRC can develop 
about 10 competency models per year. If the pilot project shows that 
competency models are a viable alternative to the current process for 
training employees in new skills, expansion to the wider NRC workforce, 
including the development of additional competency models, would begin 
in late fiscal year 2018 at the earliest. 
                                                                                                                    
2NRC could not provide information on how many positions or employees are covered by 
these office-level qualifications because this information is not tracked at the agency level.  
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Figure 5: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Competency Model for Health 
Physicist 
 
 
Establishing a workforce management panel. In 2015, NRC created a 
workforce management panel to assist in workforce management, 
particularly with regard to external hiring; this panel includes deputy office 
directors and a deputy regional administrator.3 The workforce 
management panel was charged with, among other things, reviewing 
requests from offices for new hires and merit promotions and overseeing 
transfers from surplus positions to vacancies, within the context of NRC’s 
resource constraints. The panel uses a set process to move staff out of 
surplus positions into positions where there is a vacancy and demand for 
work, and it provides advice to the Office of the Chief Human Capital 
Officer in support of workforce management decisions. 
Offering voluntary early retirement incentives. To reduce the number 
of surplus positions, encourage attrition, and prepare for potential 
downsizing of the agency in the future, NRC has provided two rounds of 
                                                                                                                    
3The panel’s official name is the Strategic Workforce Oversight and Utilization Panel, 
which for the purposes of this report we refer to as the workforce management panel.  
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incentives for voluntary early retirement. These incentives included lump 
sum payments and temporary decreases in age and service requirements 
for retirement eligibility to increase the number of employees who were 
eligible for retirement. NRC officials said that in 2015 and 2016, a total of 
135 individuals were approved for early retirement incentives, and that 
the agency has the authority from the Office of Personnel Management to 
offer 126 more through June 2018. However, these officials said that as 
of November 2016, the agency had not yet determined whether it will 
offer additional incentives before the authority expires.4 Human capital 
officials said that part of the justification for early retirement incentives 
was for them to be offered to employees in positions that would be 
restructured or eliminated, and thereby reduce the number of employees 
in surplus positions. NRC has also used early retirement incentives to 
manage skill levels within its workforce. For example, NRC officials said 
the agency may have a person with a high grade level working in one 
area but a lower grade level position in another area that needs to be 
filled. In this case, NRC cannot shift the high grade level employee 
without downgrading the employee, but the agency could use early 
retirement incentives to reduce the number of high grade level employees 
in that area. 
Reprioritizing work activities. To reduce resources allocated to low-
priority workload areas, NRC performed a one-time agencywide 
prioritization and rebaselining effort under Project Aim. Within this effort, 
NRC developed an agencywide framework to assess all NRC activities 
with more than 10 FTEs to determine if they (1) required minimum effort 
to achieve statutory mandates; (2) required prudent effort above the 
minimum needed to achieve statutory mandates; or (3) were activities 
that could be shed, deferred, or done with fewer resources without 
materially compromising the agency’s safety and security mission. After 
sorting the activities into these three categories, NRC’s rebaselining team 
developed a one-time plan to reduce the agency’s workload by 
eliminating activities in the third category during fiscal years 2016 through 
2018. Rebaselining resulted in a plan to cut 150 low-priority activities, 
thereby reducing NRC’s contractor support by $18 million and agency 
staff by 185 FTEs. As of February 2017, NRC had made 138 of the 150 
proposed cuts to low-priority activities, resulting in a reduction of 147 
FTEs. 
                                                                                                                    
4Federal agencies receive authority to offer early retirement incentives by the Office of 
Personnel Management, which consults with the Office of Management and Budget.  
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Cross-training employees. To manage the size and composition of the 
agency’s workforce, NRC is training existing staff in new skill areas, which 
NRC refers to as cross-training. NRC’s strategic workforce plan says that 
retraining existing staff in new skill areas can be an especially useful 
strategy to develop individuals occupying surplus positions. NRC human 
capital officials said that all employees are encouraged to incorporate 
training in new skill areas into their individual development plans and to 
move to different parts of the agency as part of their career development; 
these officials said this is particularly true for staff in surplus positions. 
They also said that because cross-training and reassignment of 
employees is voluntary, the agency does not have specific statistics 
available on the number of employees who have been cross-trained or 
reassigned and placed into a new position. 
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